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Editor’s Note: This paper was given in response to Dr. Glenn’s presentation.

Charles Glenn: A Response

by Nicholas Lantinga

Perhaps the central political theoretical question
underlying the relationship between education
and politics is the question of pluralism. How do
people who disagree over profoundly important
matters live together? We need to recognize that
this question of pluralism always rests on an
authoritative vision, which compels a political
community toward pluralism or uniformity.
Dr. Glenn’s fine comparative study, “Historical
Background to Conflicts over Religion in Public
Schools,” does us all a great service by describing
the deeply conflicted attempts to situate
Christianity within the public-legal orders found
in Europe and North America. I believe he adequately relates these various attempts to the particular histories of state education policies.
However, I believe that more can be gained by
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connecting these various brief histories to the
broader debate over religious pluralism. This long
political-philosophical debate is not foreign to Dr.
Glenn’s concern but is the broader framework of
meaning in which the particular debate resides. I
believe that recalling this larger frame of reference can help us (1) better understand the variations in current education policy, (2) better understand the various histories of education policy
within Western Europe and North America, and
(3) direct our efforts toward further educational
justice within North America.
I will briefly outline the contours of the long
debate and then conclude by noting some ways in
which this approach strengthens Dr. Glenn’s own
effort to understand some of the paradoxes of
contemporary education policy.
Constantine’s fourth-century adoption of
Christianity as the official religion of the Roman
Empire lasted, in one form or another, until
Europe’s sixteenth-century wars of religion.
After the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 and finally
after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the authoritative vision of Pope and Emperor was forever
divided among the many new states. This division did not mean that religious orthodoxy no
longer mattered to Lutherans, Calvinists,
Catholics, and Anabaptists. Rather, seventeenthcentury Europe settled on the formula cuius
regio, eius religio—“whose reign, his religion”
(Lindberg 247)—as a practical answer to the
question of pluralism.
After Westphalia, Hobbes, Locke and
Rousseau, among others, re-examined the limited
rights afforded religious dissenters. Hobbes and
Rousseau opposed religious orthodoxy as lethal
to the political community. Hobbes placed all
under the sovereignty of a Leviathan state, a
“mortall God,” and Rousseau sought to coalesce
all citizens into a General Will reinforced by civil
religion. Locke, on the other hand, sought to
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extend religious liberty to all but atheists, Papists,
and “Mahumetans.” However different these
thinkers may appear, they all redefined
Christianity as essentially private and otherworldly, in a word, Gnostic. Public life, as opposed to
the private life of faith, would be rational and
inter-subjective—that is, based on principles
everyone agrees upon.
Notable dissenters included Edmund Burke in
England and Groen Van Prinsterer in Holland.
Burke based his opposition to enlightenmentinspired revolution on English customs, which he
believed to be blessed by God, and Van Prinsterer
looked for scriptural norms. Both recognized the
dangers of radically humanist first principles for
civil society. That is, both recognized that terror
would result from imposing a radically
Promethean set of principles upon society.
Against Hobbes and Rousseau, America’s
founders crafted their own response to the question of pluralism. The solution, as Madison wrote
in Federalists 10 and 51, was to promote a proliferation of factions within an ever-expanding
commercial republic. (Looking back to Lloyd
Den Boer’s response to Dr. Glenn’s paper, I
would point out that the ideology of the common
school is opposed to the federalist tradition of
controlling disunity through the proliferation of
factions.) The Federalists seem to have created
not so much a solution as a way to put off the
question as long as possible. For a couple of reasons, I think that the time is up on this approach.
A growing number of American Christians are
increasingly insistent that their whole life reflects
their Christian commitment. Further, Christians
are increasingly suspicious of liberal claims about
public neutrality. We are rightly alarmed when the
Supreme Court declares that central to being
human is a “right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life” (Casey v. Planned
Parenthood). This claim sounds rather like theology—and bad theology at that.
What does this brief overview mean for Dr.
Glenn’s paper? First, at least in four countries surveyed there seem to be connections between the
history of education policy regarding religion and
the Enlightenment’s final solution for religious
liberty. In France, Rousseau’s enlightenment plan
continues to prevail, as the recent decision
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regarding the hijab demonstrates. In England, a
rather Burkean traditionally religious organization of the schools appears to suffice—barely. As
increasingly large numbers of Muslims take up
residence, they add pressures that England’s own
national tradition of religious tolerance will likely prove unable to accommodate. In the United
States, militant secularists and Christians, both
descendants of America’s founding, continue to
battle for the soul of the Supreme Court. This battle has become so fierce in part because the
Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence is nearly
devoid of guiding principles. It can no longer
simply exclude religious viewpoints because the
liberal swindle of public rationality has been
revealed and important segments of the population reject it. Thus, the Supremes cast about, aimlessly contradicting precedence until the only
thing guiding current decisions seems to be the
ability to cobble together five votes.
As justices look about for principles to guide
public life, we might recommend the Dutch
approach for a couple of reasons. First, in part
because of the insights of Van Prinsterer, and later
of Kuyper, the Dutch recognized and rejected the
liberal swindle. That is, the Dutch did not allow
the myth of viewpoint neutrality to privilege one
set of schools over another. In that sense we
would do well to abandon such terms as “public”
and “private” as they refer back to an authoritative vision that restricts pluralism to those who
accept liberal premises. Second, the Dutch seem
to have connected honest faith with pluralism.
That is, they have recognized that forced faith is
false faith. Because a true conversion to the
gospel cannot be coerced by the state, Christians
should seek a pluralist public-legal order where
people of other faiths can nurture their own
vision. The authoritative vision that gives rise to
these principles is not neutral but rather exemplifies the ways in which orthodox Christian belief
can move beyond liberals’ supposed goal of tolerance toward authentic religious freedom within
education.
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